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Abstract—Air-gap covert channels are special types of covert
communication channels that enable attackers to exfiltrate data
from isolated, network-less computers. Various types of air-gap
covert channels have been demonstrated over the years, including
electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic, optical, and thermal.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of vibrational (seismic)
covert channel. We observe that computers vibrate at a frequency
correlated to the rotation speed of their internal fans. These
inaudible vibrations affect the entire structure on which the com-
puter is placed. Our method is based on malware’s capability of
controlling the vibrations generated by a computer, by regulating
its internal fan speeds. We show that the malware-generated
covert vibrations can be sensed by nearby smartphones via the
integrated, sensitive accelerometers. Notably, the accelerometer
sensors in smartphones can be accessed by any app without
requiring the user permissions, which make this attack highly
evasive. We implemented AiR-ViBeR, malware that encodes
binary information, and modulate it over a low frequency vibra-
tional carrier. The data is then decoded by malicious application
on a smartphone placed on the same surface (e.g., on a desk).
We discuss the attack model, provide technical background, and
present the implementation details and evaluation results. Our
results show that using AiR-ViBeR, data can be exfiltrated from
air-gapped computer to a nearby smartphone on the same table,
or even an adjacent table, via vibrations. Finally, we propose a
set of countermeasures for this new type of attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital information processing, communication and stor-
age are the backbone of modern organizations. Information,
however, seems to be the most coveted asset of our era,
and accordingly attracts malicious adversaries. Modern or-
ganizational networks are protected with a wide range of
security products and monitoring systems including firewalls,
intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), data leakage prevention
(DLP) solutions, AV programs, and the like. When highly
sensitive data is involved, an organization may resort to air-gap
isolation, in which there is no networking connection between
the local network and the Internet. In this approach, any type
connection between the internal network and the Internet is
prohibited.
A. Air-gap breaches
Despite the level of isolation and lack of Internet con-
nectivity, attackers have successfully compromised air-gapped
networks in the past. Such networks can be breached by
skillful combinations of devious malware and attack vectors
[1], [2], [3], [4]. One of the most known incidents is the
Stuxnet malware which penetrated uranium enrichment fa-
cility. In 2018, The US Department of Homeland Security
accused Russian government hackers of penetrating America’s
power utilities [5]. Due to reports in the Washington Post
in November 2019, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India
Limited (NPCIL) confirmed that the Kudankulam Nuclear
Power Plant suffered a cyber-attack earlier that year [6].
B. Air-gap exfiltration
While breaching such systems has been shown feasible in
recent years, exfiltration of data from systems without network
or physical access is still considered a more challenging task.
Most of the covert communication channels explored so far
are electromagnetic [7], [8], acoustic [9], [10], optical [11],
[12] and thermal [13]. Accordingly, various countermeasures
exists for these types of covert communication channels.
C. Vibration-based covert-channels
In this paper, we introduce a new type of vibration-based
(seismic) covert-channel. We show that malware can regulate
the level of mechanical vibrations generated by a computer
by controlling its fan rotation speed. These vibrations affect
the entire structure on which computer is placed. Data can be
encoded in these vibrations and then received by a smartphone
placed on the table via the accelerometer sensor. We imple-
ment and evaluate the covert channel and test it in a typical
workplace environment.
D. Accelerometers in smartphones
The proposed air-gap covert channel is highly evasive from
the attacker’s perspective.
• No permissions are needed. Smartphone accelerometers
are considered safe sensors. Android and iOS operating
systems applications do not request user permissions to
read the outputs of the accelerometer samples.
• No visual indication. There may be no visual indication
to the user that an application is using the accelerometer.
• JavaScript access. The accelerometer may be accessed
from a Web browser via standard JavaScript code. This
implies that the attacker Isn’t required to compromise the
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user’s device or install a malicious application. Instead,
the attacker can implant malicious JavaScript on a le-
gitimate website that samples the accelerometer, receives
the covert signals, and exfiltrates the information via the
Internet.
E. Scope of this paper
In this paper we show the feasibility of the proposed
vibration-based covert channel, e.g., the capability of trans-
mitting binary data over mechanical vibrations between work-
stations and smartphones. However, the physical layer of the
vibrational covert channel is highly dependents on the specific
environment, structure, and material of the surface and the
location of the sender and receiver. Providing a comprehensive
analytic model for the communication channel in a general
case is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future work
in the field of mechanical engineering.
II. RELATED WORK
Air-gap covert channels are special covert channels which
enable communication from air-gapped computers, mainly for
the purpose of data exfiltration. They are currently classified
into five main categories: electromagnetic, magnetic, acoustic,
thermal, and optical. This paper introduces a new category -
the vibrational (seismic) covert channel.
A. Electromangetic
Over the past 20 years, several studies have proposed the
use of electromagnetic emanation from computers for covert
communication. Kuhn showed that it is possible to control
the electromagnetic emissions from computer displays [14].
Using this method, a malicious code can generated radio
signals and modulate data on top of them. In 2014, Guri et
al demonstrated AirHopper [8], [15], malware that exfiltrates
data from air-gapped computers to a nearby smartphone via
FM signals emitted from the screen cable. Later on Guri et al
also demonstrated GSMem [16], malware that leaks data from
air-gapped computers to nearby mobile-phones using cellular
frequencies generated from the buses which connect the RAM
and the CPU. In 2016, Guri et al presented USBee, a malware
that uses the USB data buses to generate electromagnetic
signals from a desktop computer [17]. In 2018, Guri et al
also presented PowerHammer, an attack vector for leaking data
from air-gapped computers through the power lines [18].
B. Magnetic
In 2018, Guri et al presented ODINI [19], malware that can
exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via low frequency
magnetic signals generated by the computer’s CPU cores.
The magnetic fields bypass Faraday cages and metal shields.
Guri et al also demonstrated MAGNETO [20], which is
malware that leaks data from air-gapped computers to nearby
smartphones via magnetic signals; they used the magnetic
sensor integrated in smartphones to receive covert signals.
C. Optical
Several studies have proposed the use of optical ema-
nation from computers for covert communication. Loughry
introduced the use of PC keyboard LEDs to encode binary
data [21]. In 2019 research explored the threat of keyboard
LEDs with modern USB keyboards [22]. In 2017, Guri et
al presented LED-it-GO, a covert channel that uses the hard
drive indicator LED in order to exfiltrate data from air-
gapped computers [23]. Guri et al also presented a method
for data exfiltration from air-gapped networks via routers and
switch LEDs [12]. Data can also be leaked optically through
fast blinking images or low contrast bitmaps projected on
the LCD screen [24]. In 2017, Guri et al presented aIR-
Jumper, malware that uses the security cameras and their
IR LEDs to communicate with air-gapped networks remotely
[25]. In 2019 researchers introduced a covert channel (dubbed
BRIGHTNESS) which uses the LCD brightness to covertly
modulate information and exfiltrate it to a remote camera [26].
D. Thermal
In 2015, Guri et al introduced BitWhisper [13], a ther-
mal covert channel allowing an attacker to establish bidi-
rectional communication between two adjacent air-gapped
computers via temperature changes. The heat is generated
by the CPU/GPU of a standard computer and received by
temperature sensors that are integrated into the motherboard of
the nearby computer. Unlike BitWhisper which works between
two adjacent desktop computers, this paper discuss the thermal
covert channel between a desktop workstation and a nearby
mobile phone.
E. Acoustic
In acoustic covert channels, data is transmitted via inaudible,
ultrasonic sound waves. Audio based communication between
computers was reviewed by Madhavapeddy et al. in 2005
[27]. In 2013, Hanspach [28] used inaudible sound to
establish a covert channel between air-gapped laptops
equipped with speakers and microphones. Their botnet
established communication between two computers located
19 meters apart and can achieve a bit rate of 20 bit/sec.
Deshotels [29] demonstrated the acoustic covert channel with
smartphones, and showed that data can be transferred up to
30 meters away. In 2013, security researchers claimed to find
malware (dubbed BadBios) that communicates between two
instances of air-gapped laptops via the integrated speakers
and microphones using ultrasonic signals [30].
All of the acoustic methods presented above require speak-
ers. In 2016, Guri et al introduced Fansmitter, a malware
which facilitates the exfiltration of data from an air-gapped
computer via noise intentionally emitted from the PC fans
[31]. In this method, the transmitting computer does not need
to be equipped with audio hardware or an internal or external
speaker. Guri et al also presented DiskFiltration a method that
uses the acoustic signals emitted from the hard disk drive’s
moving arm to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers [32].
TABLE I: Summary of existing air-gap covert channels
Type Method
Electromagnetic
AirHopper [8], [15] (FM radio)
GSMem [16] (cellular frequencies)
USBee [17] (USB bus emission)
Funthenna [34] (GPIO emission)
PowerHammer [18] (power lines)
Magnetic
MAGNETO [20] (CPU-generated
magnetic fields)
ODINI [19] (Faraday shields bypass)
Hard-disk-drive [35]
Acoustic
Fansmitter [36], [31] (computer fan noise)
DiskFiltration [32] (hard disk noise)
Ultrasonic [28], [37]
MOSQUITO (speaker-to-speaker)
Thermal BitWhisper [13]
Optical
LED-it-GO [23] (hard drive LED)
VisiSploit [24] (invisible pixels)
Keyboard LEDs [21] [22]
Router LEDs [12]
aIR-Jumper [25] (security cameras)
BRIGHTNESS (LCD brightness) [26]
Vibration (Seismic) AiR-ViBeR, this paper (computer vibrations)
Guri et al presented Speake(a)r [33] malware that covertly
turns the headphones, earphones, or simple earbuds connected
to a PC into a pair of eavesdropping microphones when
a standard microphone is muted, taped, turned off, or not
present.
Table I. summarizes the existing air-gap covert channels.
III. ATTACK MODEL
The adversarial attack model consists of a transmitter and
a receiver. In this scenario, the transmitter is a desktop
workstation, and the receiver is a nearby smartphone belonging
to an employee.
In a first stage of the attack, the transmitter and receiver are
compromised by the attacker. Infecting highly secure networks
can be accomplished, as demonstrated by the attacks involving
Stuxnet [38], Agent.BTZ [39], and others [40], [41], [42]. In
addition, mobile phones of employees are identified, possibly
by using social engineering techniques. The employees are
assumed to carry their mobile phones around the workplace.
These devices are then infected either online, using a device’s
vulnerabilities, or by physical contact if possible. Infecting a
mobile phone can be accomplished via different attack vectors,
using emails, SMS/MMS, malicious apps, malicious websites,
and so on [43], [44], [45], [46], [47]. After gaining a foothold
in the organization, malware in the compromised computer
gathers the information of interests (e.g., encryption keys, key-
logging, etc.). In the exfiltration phase, the malware encodes
the data and transmits it to the environment via vibrations
on the surface (Figure 1). A nearby infected smartphone
detects the transmission with its accelerometer, demodulates
and decodes the data, and then transfers it to the attacker via
the Internet.
Transfer via unnoticeable vibrations
…101010001010111011
Fig. 1: Illustration of the cover channel. The malware in the
compromised computer transmits signals to the environment
via vibrations induced on the table. A nearby infected smart-
phone detects the transmission, demodulates and decodes the
data, and transfers it to the attacker via the Internet.
A. Accelerometer permissions
Note that the adversary can install applications on the
mobile device without requiring special permissions. Smart-
phone accelerometers are considered safe sensors, and mobile
OS (Android and iOS) do not request user permissions to
read the outputs of the accelerometer samples. Furthermore,
the accelerometer may be accessed from a Web browser via
standard JavaScript code. This implies that the attacker doesn’t
need to compromise the user’s device via a malicious appli-
cation. Instead, the attacker can implant malicious JavaScript
on legitimate websites that sample the accelerometer’s data.
IV. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
A. Computer fans
Various computer components such as the CPU, GPU,
RAM and HDD produce heat during normal usage. These
components must be kept within a specified temperature range
in order to prevent overheating, malfunction, and damage.
Computer fans accelerate the cooling of these components
by increasing air flow around them. Desktop computers are
typically equipped with three to four fans as listed below.
1) The PSU (power supply unit) fan. This fan is inte-
grated into the PSU at the back of the unit. It is used as
an exhaust fan to expel warm air from the PSU which
produces heat. This type of fan is managed by an internal
controller and usually cannot be monitored, controlled,
or regulated by software.
2) The chassis fan. This fan is installed on the side or at
the back of the computer case. It usually draws in cold
air from outside the computer and expels it through the
top or rear of the computer.
3) The CPU fan. This fan is mounted on top of the CPU
socket. It cools the CPU’s heatsink.
4) The GPU fan. Due to the large amount of heat emitted
from modern graphics cards, they are shipped with
dedicated cooling fans. Like CPU fans, they are mounted
AB
Fig. 2: The CPU (A) and chassis (B) fans within a typical
workstation.
TABLE II: Computer fans
Fan Availability Speed control
PSU fan High No
Chassis fan High Yes
CPU fan High Yes
GPU fan(s) Medium Yes
Others (e.g., HDD, RAM, PCI) Low Yes
to the heatsink of the GPU. Some GPUs are shipped with
a single fan, while others have multiple fans.
There are other types of computer fans which are less
common in desktop workstations. These include HDD fans,
PCI fans, and memory slot fans, which might be found in
server systems or legacy equipment. Table II lists the computer
fans and basic characteristics discussed above. Figure 2 shows
the CPU and chassis fans within a typical workstation.
In this paper we mainly focus on the chassis fans which
generate the highest level of vibrations. This fan is present
in all computers, making AiR-ViBeR a threat to virtually
almost any desktop computer today. The PSU fan has been
omitted from our discussion, since in most cases it can not be
controlled via software.
B. Fans rotation
Computer fan rotation, measured in revolutions per minute
(RPM) units, emits acoustic noise at various frequencies and
strengths. Typical computer fan speeds range from a few
hundred to a few thousand RPMs. The movement of the
fan blades, each of which pushes air in its path, creates
a compression wave with some amount of rarefaction. The
vibration level depends on the air flow, mechanics, location,
size, number of blades, and current RPM of the rotating fan.
Because the location, size, and number of blades of a fan are
fixed, the current RPM is the main factor that contributes to
variations in the vibrations. Given a fan rotating at R RPM,
the vibration induced on the surface will be at a frequency of
R/60 Hz.
RPM
Force
Radius
Fig. 3: Rotating unbalance
C. Rotating Unbalance
The vibrations caused by rotors and fans have been studied
extensively in the literature related to mechanical engineering.
In this section we describe the basic concept of rotating
unbalance. We refer the interested reader to related literature
on this topic [48], [49], [50].
Unbalance is defined as an uneven distribution of mass
around an axis, causing the mass axis to differ from the bearing
axis. When an object is rotating, the unequal mass along with
the radial acceleration create a centrifugal force. This results
in force on the bearings which causes the bearing to vibrate.
Note that even a small amount of unequal mass can produce
a noticeable amount of rotating unbalance force.
In Figure 3, a source of unbalance is shown as an object W ,
located at distance radius R, from the rotating centerline. If
the unbalance weight, radius and motor rotation speed (RPM )
are known, the centrifugal force, F , can be calculated:
t =
1
RPM
(1)
V =
2pir
t
(2)
V elocity(V ) =
Circumference(C)
Time(t)
(3)
F =
W ( 2pirt )
2
R
(4)
CentrifugalForce(F ) =Mass(W )V 2 (5)
For example, for W = 0.1 ounce, R = 2 inches and
RPM = 2600 the amount of centrifugal force produced is
F = (0.1 ounce) ∗ (
2∗pi∗3 inches
1
2600 RPM )
2
3 inches
(6)
The unbalance of computer fans can stem from many
factors, including geometrical eccentricity, difference in the
shape of the blades, corrosion, manufactured unsymmetrical
configurations and more [51]. The most common cause of
unbalance in fans is the accumulation of material or the wear
of the fan blades, which depend on the fan’s operation. All of
these situations cause a radial unbalance of the fan’s mass [52].
It is possible that with time, a fan may have more sources of
unbalance and hence may generate increased vibrations over
time.
D. Smartphone accelerometers
An accelerometer is an electromechanical device used to
measure acceleration forces. Acceleration is the measurement
of the change in velocity, or speed divided by time. All modern
smartphones have an integrated accelerometer. This sensor is
utilized by a wide range of applications such as device pairing,
navigation, activity recognition and so on. The smartphone
accelerometer measures the acceleration of the device on the
x, y, and z axes. The measurement of acceleration is provided
in units of meters per second squared:
acc = m/sec2 (7)
Typical smartphone accelerometers are capable of measur-
ing the acceleration in the x, y, and z planes to a precision
of six decimal places. For example, the Samsung Galaxy
S10 used in our experiments has an integrated LSM6DO ac-
celerometer which has a resolution of 0.0023956299 m/sec2.
E. Covert channel
Because of their high sensitivity, accelerometers can expose
privacy information to attackers. For example, TouchLog-
ger [53], TapLogger [54] and ACCessory [55] demonstrate
how attackers can recover keystrokes on touch screens from
smartphone motions. In this paper, we propose using the
accelerometer to measure covert vibrations: malware within
the computer generates vibrations by changing the workstation
fan speed; these vibrations are induced on the surface (e.g.,
a table) and measured by a malicious application within the
smartphone using the accelerometer.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe signal generation and present the
data modulation schemes and transmission protocol.
A. Fan control
CPU and chassis fans are connected to pin headers on the
motherboard via three or four wire connectors. Pins 1-2 are the
ground and 12V power pin, respectively. Pin 3 (FAN TACH)
is used for input, allowing the controller on the motherboard
to sample the current RPM. Pin 4 (FAN CONTROL) is used
for output, allowing the motherboard to control the fan speed
via a pulse-width modulation signal (PWM) [56]. In order to
control the chassis fan speed from a standard Python script, we
attached the FAN CONTROL pin to a Raspberry Pi 3 GPIO12
pin. This setup allows the initiation of PWM output directly
to the fan controller by our programs (Figure 6). During the
experiments the Raspberry Pi was located within the computer
chassis.
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Fig. 4: The raw vibration signal (bandpass filtered) generated
by fan rotation at 3000RPM and the power spectral density
(PSD) graph. The vibrations are measured 70cm from the
desktop computer.
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Fig. 5: The FFT of the vibration signal generated by fan
rotation at 3000RPM. The vibrations are measured 70cm from
the desktop computer.
B. Signal generation
We generated vibrations by manipulating the rotation speed
of the chassis fan. Our experiments show that there is a
direct correlation between the rotation speed of the fan and
the vibrations induced on the surface (due to the rotating
unbalance). Given a fan rotating at R RPM, the vibration
induced on the surface will be at a frequency of R/60 Hz.
Figures 4 and 5 show the power spectral density (PSD) and
the FFT graphs of the vibration signal generated by a chassis
fan rotating at 3000 RPM, as recorded by a nearby smartphone
on the table. The vibrations at 3000/60 = 50 Hz can be seen
in the graphs.
C. Modulation
We present two modulation schemes based on amplitude
shift keying (ASK) and frequency shift keying (FSK).
Fig. 6: The chassis fan control setup. Pin 4 (fan control pin) of
the fan is attached to a Raspberry Pi 3 GPIO12 (PWM GPIO).
Algorithm 1 modulateRTZ (fan, RPM0, RPMbase, RPM1,
bits, stateDuration, bitDuration)
1: bitStart = getCurrentT ime()
2: for bit in bits do
3: if bit == 1 then
4: fan.setRPM(RPM1)
5: else
6: fan.setRPM(RPM0)
7: end if
8:
9: sleep(bitStart + stateDuration −
getCurrentT ime())
10: fan.setRPM(RPMbase)
11:
12: bitStart + = bitDuration
13: sleep(bitStart− getCurrentT ime())
14: end for
D. Frequency-shift keying (FSK)
In the frequency-shift keying modulation, we assign distinct
frequencies to represent distinct values of binary data. We use
a version of FSK in which two distinct frequencies, f0 and f1,
represent ’0’ and ’1’ arbitrarily. A third frequency (RPMbase)
is used to separate between sequential bits. As mentioned, the
vibration frequency is determined by the current RPM, and
a change to the RPM results in a change in the vibrational
frequency such as f = RPM/60. We maintain the frequency
of the carrier by setting the fan to rotate at two speeds,
RPM0 and RPM1. Rotation at RPM0 results in a vibration
frequency of f0 (a logical ’0’), while rotation at RPM1 results
in a vibration frequency of f1 (a logical ’1’). In our modulation
we use the return to zero technique in which the signal drops
to zero frequency (RPMbase) between each bit. The operation
of the AiR-ViBer FSK modulator is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Table III provides a summary of the parameters of the FSK
modulation. Figure 7 presents the spectrogram of the FSK
modulation, where RPM0 = 1300 and RPM1 = 2600. In this
case the sequence ’10101010’ has been transmitted.
E. Amplitude-shift keying (ASK)
In the amplitude-shift keying modulation we assign distinct
amplitude levels of the carrier to represent distinct values of
binary data. We use the binary version of ASK (B-ASK), in
TABLE III: AiR-ViBeR B-FSK modulation parameters
RPM Carrier Freq. Duration Symbol
RPM0 f0 T0 ’0’
RPM1 f1 T1 ’1’
RPMbase fbase Tbase -
Fig. 7: Spectrogram of an FSK modulation. The vibration
generated with RPM0 = 1300 and RPM1 = 2600. In this
case the sequence ’10101010’ has been transmitted.
which two distinct amplitudes, A0 and A1, represent logical
’0’ and ’1,’ respectively. We control the amplitudes by rotating
the fan at two different speeds, RPM0 and RPM1, each at
a time period of T . The change in the amplitude is caused
due to the self resonant frequency of the surface (e.g., the
table). When the vibrational frequency meets the self resonant
frequency, the amplitude levels increase. The operation of
the AiR-ViBeR ASK modulator is described in Algorithm 2.
The transition between RPM0 and RPM1 causes a stronger
vibration signal. Figures 8 and 9 present the ASK modulation
as received from distances of 10cm and 100cm from the trans-
mitting computer, respectively. In these cases the transition
between 2000RPM and 2600RPM causes an increase in the
vibrations.
Algorithm 2 modulateASK (fan, RPM0, RPM1, bits, bit-
Duration)
1: bitStart = getCurrentT ime()
2: for bit in bits do
3: if bit == 1 then
4: fan.setRPM(RPM1)
5: else
6: fan.setRPM(RPM0)
7: end if
8:
9: bitStart + = bitDuration
10: sleep(bitStart− getCurrentT ime())
11: end for
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Fig. 8: ASK modulation measured 10cm from the vibrating
computer at RPM0=2000 and RPM1=2600
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Fig. 9: ASK modulation measured 100cm from the vibrating
computer at RPM0=2000 and RPM1=2600
F. Demodulation
We implemented a receiver as an app for the Android OS
based on the FSK modulation. The AiR-ViBeR receiver app
samples the accelerometer sensor and performs the signal
processing. The signals were recorded with a Samsung Galaxy
S10 smartphone, running the Android OS version 9.0 ”Pie”.
The operation of the AiR-ViBeR FSK demodulator app is
described in Algorithm 3.
The AiR-ViBeR app (11) samples and logs the accelerom-
eter sensor at a frequency of 500Hz. The main function runs
in a separate thread. It is responsible for data sampling, signal
processing and data demodulation. In our case we sampled
the accelerometer sensor using the Android sensors API.
We used the type TYPE ACCELEROMETER to sample the
acceleration levels. It then performs a fast Furrier transform
(FFT) to the two spectrum in order to measure the power
at frequencies F0 and F1. The value of the current bit is
determined by the amplitude in these frequencies.
Algorithm 3 demodulate(sampleRate, fftSize, noverlap, bit-
Time, F0, F1)
1: mSensorManager ←
(SensorManager)getSystemService(Context.SENSOR SERV ICE)
2: mAccelerometer ← mSensorManager.getDefaultSensor(Sensor.TY PE ACCELEROMETER)
3: mSensorManager.registerListener(this,mAccelerometer, SensorManager.SENSOR DELAY FASTEST )
4:
5: onSensorChanged(SensorEvent event) {
6:
7: enabled← False
8: indexF0← fftSize ∗ F0/sampleRate
9: indexF1← fftSize ∗ F1/sampleRate
10: samplesPerBit← sampleRate ∗ bitT ime/(fftSize−
noverlap)
11: magnitude← getV ectorMagnitude(event)
12: buffer.append(magnitude)
13: if buffer.size() == fftSize then
14: fftWindow ← fft(buffer)
15: buffer.removeRange(0, fftSize− noverlap)
16:
17: amplitudeF0← abs(fftWindow[indexF0])
18: amplitudeF1← abs(fftWindow[indexF1])
19:
20: if amplitudeF0 > amplitudeF1 then
21: samples.append(0)
22: else
23: samples.append(1)
24: end if
25:
26: if not enabled then
27: enabled = detectEnable(samples, samplesPerBit)
28: end if
29:
30: while enabled & samples.size() >=
samplesPerBit do
31: if 2 ∗ sum(samples) >= samplesPerBit then
32: bits.append(1)
33: else
34: bits.append(0)
35: end if
36: samples.removeRange(0, samplesPerBit)
37: end while
38: end if
39: return bits
40:
41: }
Preamble Payload Parity
Fig. 10: the whole frame as received by a smartphone located
on the table.
G. Bit-framing
We transmit the data in small packets composed of a
preamble, a payload, and a parity bit.
• Preamble. A preamble header is transmitted at the be-
ginning of every packet. It consists of a sequence of
eight alternating bits (’1010’) which helps the receiver
determine the carrier wave frequency and amplitude. In
addition, the preamble allows the receiver to detect the
beginning of a transmission. Note that in our covert
channel the amplitude of the carrier wave is unknown
to the receiver in advance, and it mainly depends on the
vibrating surface and the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver. These parameters are synchronized with
the receiver during the preamble.
• Payload. The payload is the raw data to be transmitted.
In our case, we arbitrarily choose 32 bits as the payload
size.
• Parity bit. For error detection we add a parity bit at hte
end of each frame. In the more advanced frame an eight
bit CRC (cyclic redundancy check) is added to the end of
the frame. The receiver calculates the parity or CRC for
the received payload, and if it differs from the received
parity/CRC, an error is detected. The spectrogram in
Figure 10 shows the full frame (preamble + payload +
parity) as received by a smartphone on the table.
VI. EVALUATION
Our measurement setup consists of desktop computers for
transmission and smartphones installed with the AiR-ViBeR
app for the reception ].
We used the off-the-shelf desktop PCs listed in Table IV.
During the tests, we control the fan speed via the Raspberry Pi
as described in Section V. For the measurements we used the
Samsung Galaxy S10 smartphone with the Android OS version
Fig. 11: The AiR-ViBeR app while receiving the ”secret”
word (42 bit) exfiltrated from an air-gapped computer via fan-
generated vibrations.
9.0 ”Pie” installed; accelerometer model STM LSM6DSO is
integrated in this smartphone.
It is important to note that the vibrational covert channel is
highly dependent on the specific environment, structure and
material of the surface and the location of the sender and
receiver. Providing a comprehensive analytic model for this
covert channel in various scenarios is beyond the scope of
this paper and left for future work in this field.
A. Vibration surface
We measured the vibration signal as received by the smart-
phone located in various places on a typical workplace table.
The desk shown in Figure 12 consists of two adjacent tables
(150x70cm each) and two cabins. During the test, we transmit-
ted chirp (sweep) signals from the Workstation-0 and sample
them with a smartphone at nine different locations on the two
tables. We used MATLAB to compute the SNR at a frequency
of 43Hz (2580RPM). The results are presented in Table V. As
can be seen, the PC-generated vibrations can be sensed all over
the two tables (points 0-6), and at one of the adjacent cabins
as well (point 7).
B. Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
We measured the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio for the covert
vibrational channel at various distances. During the experi-
ments, the desktop computers and smartphone receiver were
located on a flat lab table (with dimensions of 200X100cm).
Figures 13 and 14 present the SNR values of Workstation-
1 and Workstation-2, respectively. As can be seen, the SNR
values varying depending on the exact position of the receiver
on the table. We observed that the SNR may be better at
certain table locations, e.g., toward the edge of the table. As
noted before, the quality of the vibrational covert channel is
TABLE IV: The desktop workstations used for the evaluation
# Case CPU Board Max RPM
Workstation-0 OptiPlex 9020 Intel Core i7-4790 CPU 3.60GHz DELL 0N4YC8 2600
Workstation-1 Infinity Intel Core i7-4790 CPU 3.60GHz Gigabyte GA-H87M-D3H board 3260
Workstation-2 Lenovo ThinCentre Intel Core i5v 2400 CPU 3.60GHz Lenovo board 3260
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Fig. 12: Measurement points on the table
TABLE V: Signal measurements for different locations
Location 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SNR 45.02 dB 21.68 dB 29.12 dB 16.81 dB 22.1 dB 11.38 dB 21.43 dB no clear signal 7.88dB
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Fig. 13: SNR of the transmis-
sion from Workstation-1
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Fig. 14: SNR of the transmis-
sion from Workstation-2
highly dependent on the specific environment, structure, and
material of the surface and the location of the sender and
receiver. These SNR values reflects the quality of the signal
and background noise using this specific setup.
C. Bit error rate (BER)
We measured the bit error rates (BER) for receiver locations.
In these experiments we repeatedly transmitted sequences of
37 random bits in the structured packet, decoded them, and
compared the results with the original data. We chose to use
FSK modulation, since it is faster and more robust for the
purpose of data exfiltration than ASK modulation. We set the
Tbase to 1.5sec and the T0 and T1 to 0.5sec. The channel
properties are summarized in Table VII.
Table VI presents the BER measurements for Workstation-1
and Workstation-2. In this case the base frequency was set to
3030 RPM, and the high and low frequencies (’1’ and ’0’)
were set to 3260 RPM, and 2600 RPM, respectively.
As can be seen, with Workstation-1 we maintained a BER
of 0% up for a distance up to 140cm from the receiver, and
2.7% for a distance up to 160cm. With Workstation-2 we
maintained BER of 0% for a distance up to 120cm from the
TABLE VI: Bit error rates
# On case 10cm 30cm 50cm 70cm 90cm 110cm 140cm 160cm
Workstation-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8.1 0 2.7
Workstation-2 0 0 5.6 0 0 0 0 - -
TABLE VII: Channel properties
Base High Low
Frequency 3030 RPM 3260 RPM 2600 RPM
Time 1.5 sec 0.5 sec 0.5 sec
Fig. 15: Vibrations generated by a sweep signal of the CPU
fan.
receiver. Practically, this implies that BER close to 0% can be
maintained at distances of 120-150cm in our setup.
D. CPU fans
We also tested the ability of the CPU fan to generate vibra-
tions for the purpose of exfiltration. The results show that the
vibration signals can only be received by a smartphone located
on the workstation case or very close to the workstation (up
to 5cm away). Figure 15 presents the spectrogram of a sweep
signal generated from a CPU fan of a workstation. The signal
is sampled by a smartphone placed on the workstation case.
Our measurements show that when the receiver is placed on
top of the workstation we can obtain a signal with an SNR of
15.15dB.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
Defensive countermeasures for general TEMPEST threats
can serve as a source of inspiration for the implementation of
countermeasures for the thermal channel. The prevailing stan-
dards are aimed at limiting the level of detectable information-
bearing RF signals over a given open-air distance, or its equiv-
alent, when insulating materials are used. Practically, certified
equipment is classified by ’zones’ that refer to the perimeter
that needs to be controlled to prevent signal reception. As a
countermeasure against vibration based attacks, the ”zones”
approach should be used to define the physical distances
required by potential vibrating and sensing components con-
nected to different networks. In some cases, keeping minimal
distances between computers and smartphones is not always
practical in terms of space and administration overhead. One
solution may be to place an accelerometer sensor on computers
that contain sensitive information in order to detect anomalous
vibrations. The logs of these monitoring systems can be used
to detect covert communication attempts if they are made
available to an aware analyst or appropriate policies are put
in place.
Software-based countermeasures include the use of endpoint
protection to detect code which interferes with the fan control
API or accessing the fan controlling bus (e.g., ACPI and
SMBus). In a typical system, no process should access the fan
control. Such a fan access monitor should be implemented as
a low-level driver in the kernel. However, software counter-
measures have been shown to be porous [57] as an attacker
can bypass them using rootkits and other evasion techniques.
It is also possible to jam the communication channel by
interrupting or masking the original transmissions. In the
internal jamming approach, a dedicated process that changes
the fan speed at random times and RPMs is used. However,
such a process can be evaded by user level malware unless
it is implemented as a kernel driver. Note that even if such
a jammer is implemented in the kernel it can be disabled or
evaded by kernel rootkits. Pseudo code of such a jammer is
shown in Algorithm 4. A jammer thread reads the fan speed
and changes it periodically at random thresholds. The effect
of such a jammer on the communication channel is shown in
Figure 16. The figure shows the spectrogram and the power
spectral density graph of a jammed communication channel.
In this case, we tried to transmit the sequence of bits used in
the BER measurements. With the presence of the jammer, we
measured BER above 30%. As can be seen, the interruptions
add constant vibrational noise to the spectrum which masks
the original signals.
Algorithm 4 jammer (fan, threshold, duration timeInterval)
1: currentFanRPM = getFanRPM()
2: delta = random(−threshold..threshold)
3: fan.setRPM(currentFanRPM + delta)
4: sleep(duration)
5: fan.setRPM(currentFanRPM)
6: sleep(timeInterval)
In the external jamming approach, a dedicated component
that generates random (unnoticeable) vibrations is attached to
the computer. Such a solution is considered to be trusted in
term of security since it can not be accessed by malicious
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Fig. 16: The spectrogram and power spectral density graph of
a jammed communication channel
code run on the computer. However this type of solution
is impractical for deployment on every computer due to the
maintenance it requires (e.g., power source).
Physical isolation in which the computer chassis is built
with special vibration resistance computer cases or low-
vibration fans is also an option for limiting the attack [58].
Finally, replacing the original computer fans with a water
cooling system is possible [59]. However, such a solution is
costly and impractical on a large-scale.
Table VIII contains the list of defensive approaches.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a new type of vibration-based
covert channel. We show that malware running on a computer
can generate vibrations via the chassis fan in a controlled
manner. The unnoticeable vibrations can be sensed by a
smartphone located on a table using its accelerometer. Binary
data can be modulated on top of the vibrations; then it can
TABLE VIII: Countermeasures
Countermeasure Type Cons
’Zones’ approach Prevention Maintenance
Water cooling systems Prevention Cost
Vibration resistance cases and fans Prevention Cost and maintenance
Vibration monitoring Detection Can be evaded
Vibration jamming Jamming Can be evaded
Generate random vibrations Jamming Cost and maintenance
be decoded on the smartphone and sent to the attacker via the
Internet. We discuss the implementation of the transmitter and
receiver and present a transmission protocol. We evaluate the
communication channel, and in a typical workplace scenario
and show that data can be exfiltrated at a speed of half a bit
per second via the covert vibrations. Finally, we discuss a set
of defensive countermeasures.
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